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Using the Indian medical device sector as a case study, his research examines the evolution 
of regulatory frameworks by analysing the conditions a d processes through which regulatory 
environments for a technology-based industry come about. It also attempts to unpack the 
complex relationships between industrial capabilities in healthcare technology and human 
health, and the role of regulation in facilitating more inclusive healthcare and development in 
emerging countries. In doing so, the paper explains the ways in which an absence of collective 
action can severely inhibit the development of appro riate technological regulation and 
industry growth, particularly in the context of developing countries. It shows that 
contestation, conflict and coalitions as a key mechanism through which different stakeholders 
influence, enable and/or disable institutional change. These findings have significant 
implications for other developing countries which are struggling with the development of 
healthcare technology regulatory policy that is appro riate to local societal context and needs.  
 




















1.0 Introduction  
The healthcare sector is witnessing an increasingly expanding domain of innovative 
biomedical technologies, promoted as radically changing the character of medicine, 
healthcare and human health itself (Sorenson, 2015). These developments pose significant 
challenges for law, regulation and governance. The life science industries and biomedical 
innovation are a significant part of government agendas and a major subject of public concern 
about risks and benefits (Faulkner, 2012). Regulation policy has emerged as an important 
pillar of technology policy and an integral part of government intervention to stimulate and 
control innovation. Regulatory policy in healthcare sector adds a new challenge as it straddles 
the boundaries of several disciplines and requires th oretical, analytical and conceptual 
insights from other disciplines complementing insights from law and political science 
(Altenstetter, 2014).  From an innovation systems pers ective, innovation and regulation are 
path dependent processes influenced by state and non-state actors (Nelson, 2002). Here 
regulation is viewed as ‘a process of involving sustained an attempt to control, order or 
influence the behaviours of actors so as to produce identified outcomes’ (Harmon and Kale, 
2015). For the healthcare sector, Altenstetter (2014:363) argues that ‘how and to what extent 
each regulatory framework has evolved over time, and what triggered these institutional 
changes, remain at the centre of political, social and scientific forces that together shape 
national regulators’ responses to new challenges and thus relations between technology and 
society.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the form, scope, and stringency of regulation have been and continues to be, 
much discussed, with governments frequently strugglin  to devise appropriate regulations that 
balance all stakeholders’ interests. Studies on healthcare regulation clearly show its impact on 
shaping innovation trajectories, influencing industry structure and determining firm-level 
technology strategies (Faulkner, 2009).  In developing countries, regulation is strongly linked 
with preventing counterfeit products, and the approriateness and enforcement capacity of 
local governments (Harmon and Kale, 2015). Despite the ever-expanding knowledge base, 
Sorenson (2012) argues that more research is needed to assess factors and processes 
influencing the evolution of regulatory frameworks in different contexts and their impact on 
local manufacturers and health systems.  
 
Similar to pharmaceuticals and vaccines, medical devices are essential for patient care in 
operating theatres, at the bedside, even before a patient is admitted to a hospital, or after 
discharge. According to the WHO (2012) “medical devic s” includes everything from highly 
sophisticated computerised medical equipment down t simple wooden tongue depressors. 
There has been extensive research that explored the evolution of regulation and its impact on 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries but regulation in medical device industries has 
remained a neglected area of research in social science and health policy studies (Altensetter 
and Premanand, 2010) and only a few studies have been published focusing on medical 
device regulation (Altenstetter 2003; Altenstetter 2008; Altenstetter 2012; Altenstetter and 
Permanand 2007; Kramar et al. 2012; Kramar et al. 2013). In developing countries, some 
research has focused on the issues of diffusion and access of medical devices (WHO, 2012; 
Kale and Wield, 2019, Nadvi, 1999; Loureiro et al.,2008). Yet, the regulation and 
development of appropriate medical devices affordable to local population appears under-
researched and needs more attention. Building on the work of Altenstetter (2010) and 
Faulkner (2009), this research tracks the evolution of I dian medical device regulation and 
analyses its impact on local manufacturers and availability of affordable healthcare, revealing 
















The Indian medical device industry provides an appro riate setting to conduct this research. 
Over the years, the Indian medical device regulatory framework has oscillated from lack of 
regulation to inappropriate regulation to coherent gulation. Further, compared to the Indian 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, medical evice industry has struggled to make a 
significant impact on local healthcare provision. Employing qualitative methodology this 
research explores how regulatory institutions evolve, what factors trigger that change and 
examines the impact of these changes on local firms and affordable healthcare.  
 
This paper shows that evolution of Indian medical device regulation was profoundly and 
negatively shaped by limited understanding of the medical device industry among 
policymakers; by policy fragmentation within government departments; and an absence of 
institutional linkages between industry and governme t. It further reveals that the expertise 
mobilised to reform the regulatory and governance system was disconnected from local 
contexts, giving rise to a healthcare technology and regulatory policy detrimental both to local 
firms and consumers but beneficial to multinational firms, counterfeit manufacturers and 
spurious distributors, with negative consequences for the local health systems and industrial 
capacities.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section two discusses drivers and significance of 
regulation in healthcare sectors, highlighting the key issues that have shaped medical device 
regulation in both advanced and developing countries.  Section three explains the theoretical 
framework while section 4 elaborates on our research methodology. Section five describes the 
evolution of regulation of the Indian medical device sector in three different phases. Section 
six discusses the conditions and processes influencing the development of Indian medical 
device regulation. Section seven offers some policy implications and presents the main 
conclusions drawn. 
 
2.0 Regulation in healthcare: Evolution and impact 
Over the past several decades, the regulation of healthcare technologies has become more 
vital as well as highly contentious. From an innovation systems perspective, the nation state is 
seen as the central actor in setting regulation norms. The global nature of industry activity 
means that state-level governance must engage with international and global forms of 
governance, public and private, in its search for efici nt modes of improving society’s access 
to innovation (Faulkner, 2012). As such, the policy environment within which decision-
making is exercised is spread among actors with varying perspectives and objectives. That 
said, some common objectives among healthcare stakeholders are held: to ensure safety, 
efficacy and quality of products for mass consumption, to create a set of incentives and 
constraints to influence behaviour of economic agents with the assumption that these rules 
stimulate development of safe and effective innovative products, and to develop sustainable 
institutional modes that have enough flexibility to accommodate the evolution of a particular 
set of technologies (Harmon and Kale, 2015).  
 
These innovative healthcare technologies need regulatory approvals to enter markets and that 
has significant implications for product life cycles, R&D costs and competitiveness 
(Henderson et al., 1998). Building on this, Tait et al., (2007) and Altenstetter (2014) point out 
that in the healthcare industries, regulation has a strong impact on market behaviour, firm 
strategies, the dynamism of the sector and patient access to new technologies. In this context, 
Sorenson (2014) points out that regulation inevitabil y brings together public and private 
interests in a process where there are potential winners and losers and the perception of the 















face political pressures and stakeholder resistance, leading to problems with compliance or 
hastened approval processes that may introduce later s fety risks or actualised injury 
(Sorenson, 2015). As a result, studies on regulation and technological innovation in the 
healthcare sector are increasingly focused on the boundaries of regulation and limits to 
governance in this regard (Lyall et al., 2009). Previous studies on regulatory changes in 
healthcare industries have engaged with issues such as how is regulation constructed under 
conditions of scientific and technological uncertain y and ‘inherited’ regulatory pathways 
(Stokes, 2012), and how far does the operation of the regulatory regime encourage and 
depend on the interaction between regulators and regulated? (Wilson-Kovacs & Hauskeller, 
2012). In this context, Faulkner (2012:358) suggests that ‘a key issue in assessing regulation 
is the working of the ‘match’ (or otherwise) between t chnology/product/sector boundaries 
and the configuration of regulatory institution and guidance designed to regulate the field, 
noted in the concept of regulatory connection’. However, knowledge of factors and processes 
influencing the evolution of regulatory policy in different technological and societal contexts 
and their impact on local entrepreneurship and capability development is very limited. 
 
2.1 Medical device regulation:  a neglected but critical element of healthcare policy 
The medical device industry (MDI) is a semi-regulated sector globally and regulatory 
environments have significant implications for industry's performance. Medical devices 
occupy a central role in the provision of affordable healthcare and to date, medical device 
regulation has remained a neglected area in social science and health policy studies 
(Altenstetter, 2014, Sorenson & Drummond, 2013). Some studies have looked at medical 
device regulation in advanced regions (Basu & Hassenplug 2012; Kramer et al. 2012), 
emphasising the challenges with current regulation systems (Cohen & Billingley 2011; 
Freemantle 2011; Hines et al. 2010). However, in the resource constraint environment of 
developing countries, the evolution of medical devic  regulation and its linkage with 
capabilities of local manufactures and health system  have been generally poorly understood.  
 
The medical devices sector includes a huge variety of products ranging from medical gloves, 
bandages to dialysis equipment, baby incubators, and heart valves. There are more than 
10,000 major categories of medical devices and diagnostics worldwide (WHO, 2010) 
including any instrument, implant, machine, intended to be used, alone or in combination, for 
one or more specific purposes such as diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, treatment, or 
alleviation of disease (Shah and Goyal, 2008). The global medical device market was valued 
at $164 billion US in 2010, growing at a compound anual growth rate (CAGR) of 6% since 
2000 (WHO, 2012). The USA constitute 41% of the world’s total market, followed by Japan 
(10%), Germany (8%) and France (4%) (WHO, 2010). The significance of intellectual 
property rights as incentives to innovation is less important in the medical device industry. 
According to Kanh (1991), patent appears to be of relatively less important in many segments 
of the device industry as it is possible to design a medical device for a specific application in 
several different ways. Medical devices play an increasingly critical role in clinical practice, 
improving patients’ health and quality of life. Yet, Altensatter (2010) argues that the 
regulation of medical technologies is one of the most neglected areas in the National 
Innovation Systems (NIS) literature, Development Studies and Science and Technology 
Studies (STS). The significant growth of the medical device industry and consequent 
increased development and availability of sophisticated, costly devices creates a need for 
more research.  
 
Regulatory systems for medical devices have an important role in promoting technological 















is as much about risks as it is about markets and companies (Altensetter, 2012). The medical 
device industry has witnessed significant growth US$85 billion in 2001 to US$146 billion in 
2009 (Kruger & Kruger 2012), revealing increased scale and scope of use in patient care and 
markets across the world. New market entrants are akey factor in driving this large growth 
and Sorenson (2015) suggests that along with the higher number of new devices, underlying 
technologies and knowledge have become more complex. M dical technologies involve a 
combination of knowledge bases from diverse disciplines such as design, material 
engineering, medical biology, pharmacology and physiology and primarily incremental type, 
resulting from clinician insights rather than laborat ry exploration (Von Hippel, 1988), 
creating distinctive challenges for devising optimal regulation. This makes the regulation of 
medical devices a vast and rapidly evolving field that is often complicated by legal 
technicalities.  
 
In advanced countries, the early models for medical device regulation were based on drug 
regulation before splitting off from it. The inherent differences between drugs and devices 
make uncritical application of drug regulatory model for device governance significantly 
challenging (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1 Differences between medical devices and drugs (Global Medical Technology 
Alliance, 2015) 
 
Medical devices In Vitro Diagnostic Medical 
Devices 
Pharmaceuticals  
In vivo and/or ex 
vivo use 




Diagnostic intended use  Therapeutic intended 
use  
Outcomes of use 
often depend 
directly on skill or 
experience of user  
Outcomes generally not dependent 
on skill or experience of user  
Outcomes generally not 
dependent on skill or 























incorporate and are 
driven by software 
IVD components have no therapeutic 
effect – only used for diagnosis. Key 
components are those essential for 
detection of the analyte of interest.  
Biological core reagents (e.g. 
antibodies)  
Performance of tests (e.g. sensitivity, 
specificity) depends on design of 
test, geographic variations of the 
infective agent, populations, and the 
setting of use  
Variable batch sizes for a given 
reagent, individual batches of the 
same reagent may use different 
starting materials.  
Stability varies between products and 
may vary between batches.  
Generally stored at 4°-8°C  
Generally short shelf lives (< 12 
months)  
Based on pharmacology 
and chemistry; now 
encompassing 
biotechnology, genetic 
engineering, etc.  
Pharmacologic 
properties and action of 
active ingredients are 
known, based on pre-




processes and starting 
materials.  
Products stable.  
Generally stored at 
room temperature  




The performance of medical device depends not only  the device itself but also how it is 
used. Significantly, the intended primary mode of action of a medical device on the human 
body, in contrast to that of medicinal products, is not metabolic, immunological, or 
pharmacological, requiring a different set of regulations compared to pharma-biotech 
products. These differences have significant all three keys phases product lifecycle that are 
covered by regulatory controls: ‘(i) pre-market contr ls (the regulatory requirements for 
getting products approved and licensed for sale on the market (ii) post-market controls 
(understood as manufacturers’ obligation to operate a system for obtaining feedback from the 
marketplace) and (iii) medical vigilance (understood as the obligation to report serious 
adverse health incidents to the competent authority) (Altenstetter & Permanand, 2007:11) and 
that led to evolution of a legally autonomous medical device regulatory framework starting 
with the United States in 1976, which was gradually, strengthen with four major amendments 
in 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007. This strong link betwe n drug regulations with medical device 
regulation indicates path-dependent developments and interpretations are at the core of each 
medical device regulatory framework.  
 
Medical devices around the world are classified based on their safety requirements and 
several criteria are considered to evaluate the potntial risk: degree of invasiveness, duration 
of contact, affected body system and local versus systemic effects. The extent of scrutiny of 
medical devices is based on the risk class attached to their use. Low-risk devices are assessed 
by manufacturers while in case of high-risk devices significant evidence is needed for their 
evaluation. This evidence includes criteria on efficacy and safety associated with the device 
however in case of devices clinical effectiveness (when a device produces the effect intended 
by the manufacturer relative to the medical conditions) is challenging to prove. This process 
involves extensive pre-and post-market studies. All approved devices have to undergo review 
and assessment to ascertain their benefits and risks to public health before being marketed on 
the health care system. The different comparative sudies of the medical device regulation in 















regulatory processes, governance structure and evidence requirement for approval of devices 
(Sorenson & Drummond, 2014). Despite these differences the regulatory framework in these 
regions share same objectives: to ensure a level playing field for global trade and access to 
liberalised markets, to enhance human well-being, ad to secure health promotion (see 
Kramar et al., 2013; Lobmayr; 2010; Kahan, 2009; Sorenson & Drummond, 2014; Chai, 
2000, Altentstetter, 2012). This research reveals the emergence of innovative technologies, a 
globally operating industry and locally delivered healthcare as key drivers of medical device 
regulation (Altenstetter, 2014). More significantly it identifies the strong government-industry 
linkages and global harmonisation agreements as key processes that drive and shape the 
medical device regulations in advanced countries 
 
In case of developing countries, medical device regulation has remained a significant 
challenge for policymakers and industry. According to WHO, (2013), 53% of low-income 
countries (18 out of 34 low-income economies) and 45% countries in Africa have no 
regulatory authority. Evidence suggests that a lackof knowledge concerning the medical 
device industry along with lack of resources and capability has resulted in absence of 
regulation in a significant number of developing countries. For developing countries, this lack 
of capacity points to significant gaps and disconnections between governments and industry 
and between local and global knowledge sources. 
 
‘Medical-Industrial Complex’: Key role of government-i dustry linkages 
Effective government-industry relations are identified as essential elements of innovation 
systems and a significant contributor to the shaping of regulations in the biopharmaceutical 
industries (Watkins et al., 2015). Focusing on MDI, Nadvi (1999) demonstrates that industry 
associations not only mobilise collective response to government regulatory policies but also 
help the policy implementation process among firms. Analysing MDI regulation processes in 
advanced countries, Altenstetter (2012) notes that two teams of players are typically engaged 
in bargaining, negotiating and solving conflicts and regulatory issues in the international, 
regional, and national arena. One team consists of the United States-led medical-technology 
industry (Kruger 2005) and global device companies which, at least in the high-risk medical 
device markets, have come to dominate and are the most successful in terms of approved 
medical device innovations, profitability, and sales (Lobmayr 2011). The influence of device 
companies is reinforced by the relevant industry associations: AdvaMed in the United States; 
Eucomed and other EU-based trade associations in the EU; and the Japanese Federation of 
Medical Device Associations (JFMDA). At the helm of the other team of the regulatory 
process are the respective regulatory authorities such as USFDA, PDMA (Pharmaceutical and 
Medical Device Agency, Japan) and EMA. These two teams seek out scientific expertise 
occasionally in-house but more frequently from out-f-house professional/scientific and 
‘industry experts’ who serve on different advisory committees and provide the scientific input 
to the regulatory mission.  
 
Hancher & Moran (1989) suggest that these three constituents represent the ‘medical-
industrial’ complex of the regulatory space of medical device regulation, indicating the 
regulation of medical devices is as much as about risks as it is about markets and companies 
(Altenstetter, 2012). Emphasising significance of industry-government linkages, Tan (2012) 
reveals that in 2012, owing to pressures from various trade organisations (the Tokyo-based 
AMDD, the JFMDA, the US-based AdvaMed and the European Business Council), Japan is 
considering a legislative proposal that would separate medical devices from the 
Pharmaceutical Affairs Law. This confirms the importance of government-industry linkages 
















Influence of global harmonisation agreements 
With their power and status, the EU and the United States have emerged as a strong influence 
and a driving force for global harmonisation of medical device regulations all over the world.   
Some developing countries such as Mexico, Brazil have set up regulatory frameworks based 
on the USFDA and the EU directives. These regulatory regimes contain common structural 
features that concern with safety and effectiveness of the devices. The advanced countries are 
also pushing for harmonisation of medical device regulations around the world. For example, 
to achieve uniformity in the national medical device regularity systems and to improve access 
to safe and effective medical devices, the Global Harmonisation Task Force (GHTF) was 
conceived in 1992 by the European Union, the United States, Australia, Japan and Canada. In 
2011 GHTF was ceased to exist and replaced by the In ernational Medical Device Regulators 
Forums (IMDRF) with the aim of “accelerating international device regulatory harmonisation 
and convergence’. However, this drive for global harmonisation seriously neglects the 
significant role of nation states and national authori ies have in devising a regulatory 
framework that is suitable for local conditions. In this context this research aims to unpack the 
conditions, processes and stakeholders involved in the evolution of the medical device 
regulation in India.  
 
3.0 Theoretical framework: Collective action 
It is well established that institutional environment plays a critical role in promoting sectoral 
growth by creating a social system that either catalyses or hinders emergence and survival of 
existing and new businesses (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Gurses and Ozscan, 2015).  Within 
wider aspects of the institutional environment, governance is a widespread term used for 
describing to the overall coordination and steering of a social system – the processes that 
maintain integration, direction and oversight (Budd et al., 2006). The ways in which 
governance is carried out in a particular field or d main such as health, education or food 
varies hugely and are dependent on the innovation and social system involving a wide range 
of statutory, judicial, professional and other non-governmental bodies (Lyall et al., 2009). 
Laws and regulations are identified as critical aspects of governance structures and can 
critically promote or hinder new products and services through the institutional mechanism 
they develop (Ruso, 2001). Actual governance arrangements in any particular case are then 
some mix of these elements and can be achieved in three ways – through hierarchies (such as 
governments), through markets and through networks (Smith, 2009). In practice, the policy 
takes shape in and through such governance arrangeme ts, however imperfect.  
 
The dominant understanding of policy suggests that i s creation is essentially a formal matter 
in that policy is a result of a problem being identified, researched and analysed, then a 
recommendation being put forward, agreed on and imple ented (Budd et al., 2006). At the 
heart of this arrangement is the idea that governments and policymakers are the creators and 
instigators of policy. The rational policy-making process is attractive to participants in the 
process, and it is expected by the wider society. But the practical difficulties facing even the 
well qualified policymakers are enormous. For example, the complexity of the issues 
involved, and the quantities of information that may be relevant, can potentially overwhelm 
policymakers. This suggests that policymakers and managers must operate on the basis of 
‘bounded rationality’ (Simon, 1957). For example, Kooiman (1993:4) observes that “no single 
actor, public or private, has all the knowledge andinformation required to solve complex 
dynamic and diversified problems; no actor has sufficient overview to make the applications 















prescription approach could result in wrong policies or policies that run their course, become 
unviable under the weight of their own inefficiency to change.  
 
This gives rise to an alternative approach, and one that is critical of this linear perspective 
suggests that policies are the result of learning by doing and the building of consensus over 
time, so that changes to the way things happen take pl c  in a more organic fashion before 
eventually becoming routine and legitimate (Mackintosh, 1992). These may involve cross-
sector working with actors from public institutions or non-profit agencies. In this context, 
regulatory policy is ultimately concerned with creating the conditions for an ordered rule and 
collective action towards technology policy (Lyall, et al., 2009:1). The empirical literature has 
shown that collective action; purpose collective behaviour is a critical step for gaining socio-
political legitimacy (Olson, 1965; King and Soule, 2007) and involves different types 
occurring at multiple levels (Ostrom, 2009). Collective action can take the form of social 
movement involving a mobilised network of groups and organisations that try to achieve 
social change through collective protest (Sine & Lee, 2009) or collaboration among powerful 
firms (Ozscan & Eisenhardt, 2009). Most common form f collective action is through 
industry associations, which represents members’ interest and lobby for resources, promote 
agendas and influence policy (Watkins et al., 2016). The studies of the evolution of regulatory 
policy in the Indian IT industry shows that software and hardware were coupled a very long 
time with the policy of hardware. Yet de-coupling did happen due to effective collective 
action by the industry association which engaged th government very selectively for policies 
that they wanted for the industry (Arora & Athreye, 2002). Emphasising the significance of 
collective action in the shaping of regulatory policy, Faulkner (2012:356) suggests that state-
level governance must engage with international and global stakeholders, public and private, 
in its search for efficient modes of improving society's access to the products of technological 
innovation. However, Gurses and Ozcan (2015:1713) point out that ‘regarding collective 
action, our knowledge is limited on how actors can use different types of collective action to 
influence actors of various types, and whether theyackle them all at once or follow a certain 
pattern in their approach'.    
 
Overall, our literature review suggests that the form, scope, and stringency of regulation, and 
the actors who have had a hand in making it, role of collective action has been much 
discussed and researched in context of advanced countries (Watkins et al., 2016; Harmon & 
Kale, 2015) and there is a need for empirical historical studies that uncover processes and 
conditions involved in regulatory changes for healthcare technologies in developing countries. 
This paper fills that gap by studying the development of Indian medical device regulation.   
 
 
4.0 Research Methodology 
The characteristics of MDI such as nature of innovati n, diversity of products and their role in 
providing effective healthcare makes it a unique industry and creates challenges for 
comparison with sectors. As a result the research carried out by Altensetter (2014), Faulkner 
(2009) and Sorenson (2015) who have studied evolution of medical device regulation in 
different countries have adopted the single case study research methodology. According to 
Yin (1994) single case methodology is ideal to research a critical and revelatory case as it 
allows the researcher to analyse phenomenon in depth. Building on that, this research employs 
Indian medical device industry as a single case study to explore conditions and processes 
associated with the evolution of India’s medical devic  regulation, its impact on the 
capabilities of local medical device manufacturers and health delivery systems. This 















with illustrating what did or did not work in the development of Indian medical device 
regulation. This single case methodology employed here also follows similar studies of 
evolution of Indian industrial and regulatory policies in other technology industries such as 
the Information Technology (IT) (Arora & Athreye, 2002) and biotechnology industries 
(Chaturvedi, 2005).  
 
This research employs historical analysis method to map and understand the significance of 
key events and role played by different stakeholders in shaping the evolution of Indian 
medical device regulation. This research covers an extended period, between 1947 till 2018 as 
this longitudinal approach allows observation of processes and actors associated in shaping 
regulation over time. We divide the evolution of the Indian medical device regulation into 
distinct phases based on the nature of regulatory plicy that governed the development, 
production, distribution and marketing of the medical devices in India. This gave rise to the 
three phases. There was absence of regulation focused on the medical device from 1947 until 
2005 and this period of a regulation vacuum is termed as first phase. This significant hiatus is 
indicative of a major lack of priority given to medical device technologies even as the Indian 
state moved after independent to build and shape a whole raft of new science, technologies 
and industries. From 2005 until 2009, instead of developing appropriate regulation to build an 
important industrial sector, Indian medical devices were regulated using a reaction and 
inappropriate approach. We characterise this as a second phase of the evolution. The third 
period of 2009 till 2018 witness the emergence of colle tive action to developed appropriate 
rules of governance of medical devices and this period is termed as third phase. For each 
period, data collection focused on understanding the role and influence of different actors, the 
key processes of interactions between different actors and the prevailing political and 
economic context.  
 
Each phase had significant impact on the development of technological capabilities in the 
Indian firms and accessibility of devices for low-income population. To explore the impact of 
this evolving medical regulation on technological cpability development we categorised our 
data into two broad themes: impact of regulation on factors lying inside the firm; and those 
external to the firm. This interaction between evolving regulation and technological 
capabilities is further explored by focus on Indian medical device firms, which were involved 
in indigenously developing devices for the Indian markets.  
 
Qualitative primary data collection was carried outin two phases. The first phase involved 
semi-structured interviews with key, non-firm stakeholders associated with the medical device 
industry with the aim of understanding key events that shaped the evolution of medical device 
regulation, role played by different stakeholders and impact of this evolving regulation on 
access to affordable healthcare. These stakeholders were identified through different sources 
of secondary data such as newspaper reports, healthcare consultancy reports and business 
magazine. The participants for the first phase were chosen for their experience and expertise 
inside the medical, scientific, academic, policy, legislative and regulatory communities. 
Specifically, interviews were conducted with a leading cardiac surgeon, a biomedical 
engineer, a major Indian entrepreneur, a healthcare sector journalist, president of the Indian 
medical device association and a senior government official working with Drug Controller of 
India (DGCI).  
 
In the second phase, firm-level data collection wascarried out involving interviews with key 
stakeholder associated with Indian medical device firms. In the second phase firm level data 















Managing Director of the firm. We interviewed senior management in eight Indian medical 
device firms such as Shushrut-Adler, Achira Labs, TTK Healthcare ltd to grasp the nature and 
impact of regulatory changes and challenges Interview questions focused on the status of the 
Indian medical device industry, regulatory framework, key challenges it raised for the firm 
and its impact on the development and marketing of the chosen product. Open-ended 
questions and a relatively unstructured interview schedule were used to encourage participants 
to speak in their own words about their experiences, ob ervations and opinions. To avoid 
interviewer bias, the primary data was triangulated with secondary data collected from various 
sources such as industry journals, industry associati n publications and annual reports of 
firms.  
 
In this research a systematic approach to data capture and analysis was taken to ensure a clear 
‘audit trail’ between the data and the conclusions that were distilled (Strauss and Corbin, 
2015). The empirical evidence was analysed by using various analytical techniques such as 
pattern matching (Yin, 1994) and building of analytical tables (Miles and Huberman, 1984). 
In this research, a strategy of pattern coding is used to identify key events, conditions and 
processes involved in evolution of medical device regulation. The review of processes and 
conditions associated with the medical device regulation in advanced countries highlights it as 
an evolutionary and path dependent process shaped by government-industry linkages and 
global agreements (Altensetter, 2012). These conditi s and processes provide main themes 
for the pattern coding and formed a key part of the data analysis strategy. In the second level 
patterns corresponding to impact of evolving regulation on technological capability 
development and access to medical devices were identif ed. In both levels the replicating 
patterns were supplemented by secondary data that was collected from various sources such 
as industry journals, industry association publications and annual reports of firms. 
 
5.0 The Indian medical device industry  
The Indian medical device industry is estimated at the US$ 4.5 bn in 2012 and growing at the 
rate of 14% per annum (WHO, 2012). The industry is highly competitive and fragmented; 
there are more than 800 domestic firms primarily manuf cturing low technology products 
such as disposables/ medical supplies while MNCs dominate the high-end medical devices 
market. The Indian medical devices industry forms a very small part of the total 
manufacturing accounting for only 0.2% of all certified facilities (Deloitte, 2010). There are 
about 14000 medical devices marketed in India and more than 70% of devices are imported 
from advanced countries such as US, Japan, UK and Germany. According to Deloitte (2010), 
the key categories of items that are imported into I dia include imaging equipment, 
pacemakers, orthopaedic and prosthetic appliances, br athing and respiration apparatus, and 
dental equipment. Prof. Valiathan highlights the social cost of import dependence, 
 
the imported items are accessed by only 10% of our p pulation. For the MNCs, it is a 
huge market, Rs 120 million. But we have a 1.2 billion population, if we want to give 
them access to such items, we need to develop them ourselves.  
(Nagarajan, 2013) 
 
Over the years the domestic medical device industry has grappled with issues of quality and 
struggled to gain trust and market acceptance in the high-technology segment. Kamath (2010) 
highlights this link between quality issues and growth of the industry,  
 
The words India and medical technology are seldom used in the same sentence. An 















with some exceptions, have struggled to shed the ‘low-tech, low quality’ tag. For 
instance, doctors faulted local pacemakers for being too bulky and difficult to implant 
with leads (that connect the pacemaker to the heart muscle) fracturing easily.  
(Kamath, 2010) 
 
The current state of the Indian medical device industry raises questions about the evolution of 
regulatory policy and its impact on the technological capabilities. The next section presents 
the evolution of the Indian medical device regulation along with the role of key events, 
conditions and actors in shaping the current regulatory quagmire.  The Indian medical device 
regulation has evolved through three phases (Table 2).  
 
Table 2 Key milestones in the evolution of Indian medical device regulation 
 
Years Key events Phases 
1980 Indian government intends to frame medical device regulations but 




vacuum 1990 Indian government liberalises economy and gradually reduces import 
duty, leads to increasing import of medical devices   
2003 Mashelkar committee publishes report calling for establishment of 
medical device regulatory division in the Central Drugs Standard 
Control Organisation (CDSCO) 
2003 ICMR expert committee publishes report calling for central medical 
device regulatory authority 
2005 60 patients were harmed in hospital due to use of imported stents and 











2006 Indian government brings 10 devices under the Drugs and Cosmetics 
Acts (1940), later 4 more devices added to the list. 
2006 Industry associations starts working with govt t  frame appropriate 
medical device regulation 
2007 Legislation is drafted to develop central medical device regulatory 
authority, but no progress is made  
2008 Parliamentary committee rules against establishing central authority, 
object to the clash of views between the Ministry of Health and 
Family Welfare (MoHFW) and the Department of Science & 
Technology (DST) on the issue of regulating medical devices, DST 
issues updated Medical Device Regulatory Bill 
2008 MoHFW & DST proposed two independent bills 









2013 Amended Drugs and Cosmetic Act is introduced in the parliament  
















5.1 Phase I: Era of regulation vacuum (to 2005) 
From independence till 2005 there was effectively no quality regulation for medical devices - 
whether imported or manufactured in the country. Manuf cturers of low-tech devices such as 
thermometers and weighing instruments sought optional certification (ISI marking) from 
Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) as a proof of quality but not as a pre-market approval 
requirement. BIS certified and regulated a few other low technology devices. Due to their 
limited scope and depth, these standards and procedures were not adequate for high 
technology devices. The lack of a regulatory environment over this long period indicates the 
low priority given to medical devices compared to oher technological areas and is suggestive 
of a major gap in science and technology policy towards basic health care. 
 
In the pre-2005 era imported high technology devices approved by the country of origin or by 
the USFDA were permitted for marketing in India. However, there was no regulatory 
mechanism to check the certification of the products or product quality. For instance, in 2004 
Boston Scientific and Johnson & Johnson withdrew sale of one brand of its cardiac stents 
worldwide, but no independent information was available in India on how many of these 
devices may have been used or if any patient had reported any adverse event (Harper, 2003). 
During this period, the medical device sector stayed under the radar of different industry 
associations, civil society organisations and remained unrepresented at the government level. 
Some experts point to the small size of domestic MDI and the low-tech nature of devices as 
the main reason for the overall neglect of the industry. Dr Valiathan comments, 
 
Pharma was established in India for decades; their R&D picked up momentum after 
India signed the WTO agreement and patent regime changed.  Biotech had novelty 
and glamour and government set up a department, which promoted it aggressively.  
Devices suffered from neglect by the medical profession, technologists, industry and 
government. Poor investment in R&D facilities and absence of ’Medical Device 
legislation’ hampered the growth of the Indian medical device industry.  
(Interview data) 
          
In the early 1980s the government did realise the need for medical device regulation but 
limited understanding of how medical devices work, mechanism of action and criteria for 
performance measurement hindered further progress. A biomedical engineer with TTK 
Healthcare comments, 
 
The point was 1980, the year I joined the institute. Prof. Valiathan and I started 
working on the biomedical device act, but it all got stalled in the end. There was no 
interest or understanding.  
(Interview data) 
 
Post-1990s the economic liberalisation fuelled the growth of the Indian healthcare market and 
that gave a boost to domestic firms, increased imports of devices and brought additional 
scrutiny from domestic and international civil society organisations. Taking cognizance of the 
increasing demand for medical devices and absolute dep ndence on imports to satisfy that 
demand, the Indian government significantly reduced import tariffs on medical devices to the 
range of 15 to 30% and de-licensed imports. This result d in significant growth in scale, size 
and scope of imported devices. However, in absence of redible regulation, Harper (2003) 
argues that in some categories inferior quality products were imported and used for treating 















device actually works, its technical specifications a d performance. There was little 
information available on medical devices apart from that provided by firms for marketing 
purposes. During this period medical devices were sold in India without any monitoring by a 
regulatory authority or reporting by hospitals. With the exception of few, the majority of 
domestic firms were comfortable with an absence of regulation and made no strong demand 
for it. A leading orthopaedic equipment manufacturer points out, 
    
In medical devices multiplicity of technologies that usually brings one solution and 
thereby validation of devices is a very expensive ex rcise. In a non-regulated 
environment like India, you had companies that were not bothered about regulation 
because there was no regulation and nobody was asking for it. So these companies 
thrived in giving something cheap even without bothering to take tests if it is right. For 
example, a representative of MNC went to Ludhiana to source a key product and he 
found that manufacturing unit was actually a cowshed where they were making this 
product. That’s why the local lobby did not want any restriction.  
(Interview data) 
 
This lack of specific regulation for medical devices created significant obstacles for 
innovative domestic firms involved in indigenous R&D. For example, Sree Chitra Research 
institute struggled to launch indigenously developed h art valve, as there was no clear 
authority that was responsible for approval of high-tech medical devices developed locally. In 
the absence of local regulators, the scientists working on heart valve project decided to get the 
product tested with the USFDA. A senior engineer associated with heart valve project 
explains, 
 
In India, there are some islands of excellence in different medical device verticals. 
What these companies decided that they want to be international in their approach and 
adopted methodologies that are international. Due to the absence of local regulation, 
these companies went overseas to USFDA approvals or CE certification. My product 
was CE certified five years before the local regulation came into practice. 
(Interview data) 
 
However, getting international approvals affected completion project further delayed the 
launch of a product in the market and increased the cost of product development. Acting on a 
regulatory vacuum, the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) established an expert 
committee and in 2003 this committee released a report on setting up of the ‘Indian Medical 
Devices Regulatory Authority (IMDRA). This report hig lighted the need for regulatory 
authority, describing the prevalent regulatory situation as, 
 
The R&D efforts can benefit the country only if the final products are made available 
to the people through Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) and well-regulated 
marketing procedures. Unfortunately, no such procedure exists in the country for high-
tech devices. It appears that some imported high tech d vices, approved by the country 
of origin or by the FDA, are permitted for marketing i  India. As on date, no 
regulatory mechanisms exist even with the Drug Controller General of India (DCGI) 
for certification, quality assurance and post-market surveillance of both imported and 
indigenous medical devices. Obviously, neither any regulatory body has been 
entrusted with this responsibility nor a new organis tion has been created, leaving the 















followed, as DCGI is to refer the matters related to biomedical devices to ICMR 
(Indian Council of Medical Research) on a case-to-case basis. 
 
At the same time, another high-profile report on drug egulation also highlighted regulatory 
vacuum for high-tech medical devices. In 2003, the Indian government set up an expert 
committee headed by leading scientist Dr Mashelkar to examine drug regulatory issues, 
including the problems of spurious drugs. Going beyond the remit of drugs, the Mashelkar 
committee report called for setting up a separate division in Central Drugs Standard Control 
Organisations (CDSCO) for regulating imported and domestically manufactured medical 
devices. However, the Indian government took no action on the committee recommendations 
as it was deemed to be a no-priority area (interview data). 
 
In 2004 neglect of regulatory infrastructure resulted in a serious incident at Jamshedjee 
Jeejeebhoy (JJ) Hospital in Mumbai. The JJ hospital used unapproved drug-eluting stents on 
60 high-risk cardiac patients. Stents were manufactred by Netherland based company and 
were not approved for use in the EU markets. Taking cognisance of public outcry government 
shut down the importer and a local company. However, both importer and a local stent 
company went to court showcasing the absence of regulations. In 2005, the Mumbai High 
Court discussed the case and ordered the Indian government to set rules and standards for the 
medical device industry. This started ‘a chain of knee-jerk reactions' from the government that 
resulted in setting up of ambiguous regulation (Interview data).  
 
5.2 Phase II:  Era of ambiguous regulation (2005-2009) 
This phase is characterised by the emergence of a highly reactive and inappropriate regulatory 
regime. In March 2006, reacting to the JJ Hospital case and Mumbai high court order the 
Indian government listed 10 medical devices to be regulated in an amended Drugs and 
Cosmetics (D&C) Act, 1940. These devices required a license to manufacture, sell and 
distribute. But no other devices whether imported or manufactured in the country were 
regulated.  An orthopaedic implant manufacturer explains, 
 
At that time there two parallel things that happened. Department of Science and 
Technology had created what was called Medical Devices Safety Bill, which had 
recommended creating a separate Medical Device Regulatory Authority, MDRA, as 
they called it. Prof. Valiathan and group were involved in this. This work was 
happening when this JJ controversy came up and the hig  court ordered government to 
regulate medical devices. Government had no data or fr mework to regulate with and 
you need a lot to regulate. So at that time instead of passing a correct comprehensive 
law, what government did, they chose the route of noti ying 10 devices as drugs under 
D&C without understanding what they are doing. That is how we have landed up in 
this mess. 
         (Interview data) 
 
The Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1940 is the major source of pharmaceutical regulations in India 
and applies to all products whether local or imported. The primary objective of the Drugs and 
Cosmetic Act is to ensure safe and effective healthc re by regulating the import, export, 
manufacture, distribution and sale of drugs, cosmetics, and conduct of clinical trials. The 
amended act now included jurisdiction over “devices intended for internal or external use in 
the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of disease or disorder in human beings or 
animals, as may be specified from time to time by the central government". The Indian 















of safe and effective devices and second, to support local manufacturers by creating a 
regulatory framework for notified medical devices. 
 
Soon it emerged that there were serious problems with regulation of medical devices under 
the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. Increasingly medical devices firms operating in India began to 
experience the inconsistent application of the current guidelines causing renewed confusion 
and delays. These problems resulted in part from multiple levels of government authority 
involved in enforcing the guidelines, as well as inco sistent interpretation and application of 
the regulatory guidelines by customs officials at the ports, state drug controllers, and officials 
within the CDSCO (the US trade report, 2010). Some respondents point out that the domestic 
and international device manufacturers were assured that these regulations would not be 
stringently enforced with acknowledgement from regulators about lack of clarity and absence 
of capability to manage an increasing number of applications. In practice, the regulation was 
implemented inconsistently, and with errors, by multiple authorities.  
 
Some companies struggled to get licenses for products for more than 6-7 months even when 
they had been on the market for more than two decades nd had received regulatory approval 
for their products from overseas regulators (Kamath, 2007). Several experts concluded that 
the regulatory framework and infrastructure designed to govern pharmaceutical and cosmetic 
products was totally inadequate for governing medical devices due to the nature of difference 
in products, their action in human body and packaging. For example, the concept of sterility 
differs in pharma-biotech products and medical devic s. A drug has to be manufactured in 
‘clean room conditions’ requiring certain kind of flooring, air-flow and energy requirement to 
minimize impurities. In contrast, medical devices can be sterilised at the point of use, even in 
the operating theatre and don't require the same production conditions. For instance, an 
orthopaedic surgeon orders different sizes of implants from the company and at the time of 
surgery sterilises only those which fit patients. A head of Indian diagnostic company suggests, 
 
The main pain point for medical device sector is that it is clubbed with pharma sector 
and treated like that. There is this fundamental issue. We went to the government, 
lobbying that medical device sector should be treated s a separate sector. It should not 
be a part of D&C act. And that’s the reason why youfind a lot of confusion. 
(Interview data) 
 
In the amended law, there was no regulatory mechanism for certification, quality assurance 
and post-marketing surveillance of imported and locally made medical devices except for the 
notified devices and diagnostics. Many of these devices are sterilised using various 
techniques, the efficacy of which need to be validate  and current regulation fails to do so. 
These problems started to affect the availability of medical devices. Increasing pressure from 
industry association and complaints from patient groups forced the Indian government to act 
to improve the regulatory situation. That led to the drafting of the new amendment in 2007 
aimed at improving medical device regulation and setting up a centralised regulatory 
authority. Soon this legislation ran into trouble due to lack of expertise and understanding 
within the government. An official with industry association highlights it as a key issue, 
 
In the government, expertise to deal with the medical devices is not there. So if you 
look at the DCGI, their inspectors are basically pharma inspectors. They don’t have 
the expertise on the medical device technology. Whatever rules they apply for drugs, 















different ball game. You are talking about pricing, you talk about barcoding and so on. 
All regulations that are in place for drugs, now they are applying for devices. 
        (Interview data)     
 
During this period, the Department of Science and Technology (DST) and Ministry of Health, 
Family and Welfare (MoHFW) put forward two independt proposals, with DST suggesting 
the Medical Devices Safety Bill, 2008, as a comprehensive regulatory framework for medical 
devices and MoHFW arguing for establishment of a Central Drugs Authority (CDA) covering 
all regulated healthcare technology products. An official with industry association comments, 
 
So there are two choices; Medical Devices Safety Bill which can get reactivated and 
this, in which within the drug authority a separate m dical device regulation. 
          (Interview data) 
 
Both these proposals shared two common objectives: a regulatory regime that distinguishes 
between pharmaceuticals and devices and adequate powers to ensure standards, efficacy, 
safety and availability of medical devices manufactured or marketed in the country. But they 
differed in the proposed governance structure requid to achieve that. The MoHFW proposal 
had the CDA structure resembling the regulatory model used by the USFDA; a central body 
responsible for regulation, licensing, surveillance and monitoring of medical products and the 
uniform implementation of laws pertaining to medical devices within the country. It would 
collect fees for permission to conduct clinical trials for drugs, devices and cosmetics. The 
CDA would classify devices, notify standards and guidelines from time to time, provide a 
mechanism for conformity assessment using direct or third party notified bodies and stipulate 
the procedure and guidelines for testing laboratories. In contrast, the DST proposal suggested 
the adoption of a more de-centralised structure basd on the governance framework adopted 
by the EMA. These differences led the Indian governme t to form a parliamentary committee 
in 2008, which came up with an alternative approach. The committee suggested amending 
Drugs and Cosmetic Act of 2007 to facilitate the formation of a financially self-sustaining 
regulatory body using the existing structure (DCGI/CDSCO) to handle the administration of 
medical devices regulation without creating a big, new infrastructure or encroaching on many 
of the responsibilities of other existing bodies. Based on the belief that it is not feasible to 
remove existing institutions, the committee recommended against establishing the CDA at 
this stage (interview data).  
 
The parliamentary committee brought the focus back on the Mashelkar committee report by 
supporting one of its recommendation of restructuring, strengthening and modernizing the 
existing CDSCO under the MoHFW that will oversee a centralized licensing system and 
maintained a network of offices at the zonal and sub-zonal levels. Although all three 
proposals were unanimous about the inadequacy of the existing regulatory systems, they all 
differed on the governance system that should be adopte . The Parliamentary committee did 
note the delay in achieving appropriate regulation and linked it in part to the clashes and 
differences in approaches by the DST and the MoHFW. Prof. Valiathan points out, 
 
The Indian Medical Regulatory Authority (IMDRA) prop sed by a Government 
Committee would have been optimal.  Thanks to a turf wa  in the Government, it has 
been substituted by a Committee under the DCGA (Drug Controller General of India).  
It is too highly centralised and too bureaucratic to promote R&D and industrial 


















The Parliamentary Report involved more than one year of studies, consultation and 
negotiation with different stakeholders such as industry association, civil society 
organisations and industry experts (the US Trade Report, 2010). By 2008 the Federation of 
Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), one f India’s leading industry 
associations, took up this issue and emerged as a focal point for framing the regulations of 
medical devices. FICCI along with AdvaMed and medical device firms (local, importers and 
MNCs) started to work closely with the CDSCO and MoHWF to devise appropriate 
regulations that can aid access to medical devices, promote local production and streamlined 
the regulatory process towards global harmonisation. In late 2008, the Parliamentary 
Committee report was presented in the upper house of the Indian parliament and in December 
2008 the MoHFW renewed re-drafting of the legislation as per the Parliamentary 
Committee’s recommendations. During this period, medical devices manufactured and 
imported in India continued to be monitored under a wrong and confusing regulatory 
structure.  
 
It became apparent that those regulations specific to the India medical device industry are 
somewhat limited and lacked clarity and transparency, while low internal quality standards 
contributed to wide quality variances among products on the market. One leading diagnostic 
device manufacturer reflects, 
 
Lack of regulation was one big barrier and one of the worst things to happen. Now 
that regulation has come in, they have come in onlyfor some spectrum of products. 
But these are also not correct regulation and thereby wrongly implemented by the 
government. So I don't know what is worst; not having regulation or having 
inappropriate regulation. That is a completely erroneous thing to do.  
         (Interview data) 
 
The absence of clear regulations and inconsistent interpretation and application of the 
regulatory guidelines by multiple levels of government created a prolonged and cumbersome 
regulatory pathway for medical devices in India. 
 
Furthermore, this lack of appropriate regulatory oversight has resulted in the industry 
populated by spurious operators and counterfeit traders who used scrap material as raw 
material or import goods of uneven quality from overseas manufacturers. Many small trading 
companies importing unregulated products from China, Korea and Taiwan at a very low rate, 
even lower than Indian firms’ production cost mushroomed in the country. The market is 
flooded with non-standard look-like counterfeit products, which are sold at very low prices. 
Many of medical devices are implanted into the human body for critical care. Implanting a 
poor quality or defective device can cost the life of the patient and therefore require minimum 
standards and some control on prices. This lack of monitoring in India could have serious 
consequences for poor patients’ healthcare, as they were main recipients of cheap counterfeit 
and unsafe medical devices. The managing director at an orthopaedic implant firm points out, 
 
Due to lack of appropriate regulations, I will say almost all manufacturers chose to use 
non-certified raw material and focused on low-cost technologies. Few have bothered 
to set up quality checking units or invested in design & development facilities. There 
is no motivation, no innovation. 
















Analysis of this short period of reactive and inappropriate regulation for medical devices has 
shown that it continued to place patients in India at risk. Without appropriate regulation, 
Indian firms lacked the incentive to produce and sell higher quality devices. This, in turn, has 
contributed to a lack of development of critical innovation ecosystem for advancing medical 
device production in India. It is a major weakness in Indian technology and innovation policy. 
 
 
5.3 Phase III: New Medical Device Regulation bill: Towards a divergence from drug 
regulations (2009 to 2018) 
Eventually, the Indian government realised the need for recognising medical devices as a 
distinct category in the healthcare industries and in 2009 introduced a chapter on medical 
devices in Drugs and Cosmetics Act. Under the amended Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 
regulatory control began to be observed at manufactrer, hospitals and market level and the 
CDSCO and DCGI in the MoHFW were nominated as central bodies involved in the 
governance of drugs and medical devices in the India. To facilitate administration of device 
regulation, the CDSCO established two different unis: Device cell and Diagnostic cell, 
responsible for the oversight of medical devices and diagnostic firms. The CDSCO was 
designated as the responsible authority for the dissemination of information on registered 
medical devices, licensed distributors, and compliance. It adopted a divisional structure; with 
the central division, responsible for drafting of device standards and regulations of clinical 
research while state divisions were put in charge of r calls and licensing of manufacturing 
sites. Along with the CDSCO, the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) continues to regulate few 
other low technology devices. The imported high technology devices, approved by the 
country of the origin or by the US FDA, are permitted for marketing in India. The importers 
of medical devices can use their approvals in the US, Canada, Europe, Australia or Japan to 
register their medical devices in India. In parallel, the CDSCO also devised autonomous Good 
Manufacturing Practices (GMP) regulations for production of medical devices in India. These 
guidelines were separate from pharmaceutical sector and under the new rules, the 
manufacturer was required to comply with GMP to gain approvals. This amendment provided 
key guidelines for local manufacturers on standards required for authorisation of the medical 
devices and thereby an opportunity to develop devices that can compete with MNC products. 
 
These provisions again proved inadequate. In 2009, different industry associations intensified 
their effort and in response, the Indian government formed the Indian Medical Device 
Regulatory Review Group (IMDRV) as a forum for the industry, the regulators including the 
conformity assessment bodies, the testing institutions, and consumer groups to bring around 
overdue reform. AiMED along with other industry associations made strong representation to 
the IMDRV group and that led to the framing of specific regulations for medical device 
industries in 2012. The Drugs and Cosmetics (Amendment) Bill 2013 was introduced to the 
upper house of parliament in 2014. This draft provision laid out are largely in line with 
standard international practices developed by the International Medical Device Regulators 
Forum (IMDRF). This new legislation is expected to bring all medical devices sold in India 
under the purview of the government agency charged with regulating medical devices: the 
Central Licensing Approval Authority (CLAA) under the CDSCO. However, there still 
remains an issue of the appropriateness of these provisions for local contexts and their impact 
on supporting local innovations. For example, new bill defines adulterated device as any 
device that is composed of in any measure “rusted or corroded or filthy or putrid or 
decomposed substance”, packed under unsanitary conditions that would make it hazardous to 















‘adulterated device’ on manufacturer. However, the head of medical device industry 
association points out that device can become contami ated at point of use,  
 
So even if a user stores a device improperly, it's the manufacturers who will be held 
liable. That's not all. The bill talks about minimu standards for medical devices but 
doesn't define what these standards are. These devices are pieces of science and 
engineering. You can measure the efficacy of drugs, but not of a medical device. The 
government should measure their performance. Drugs and medical devices are two 
separate things. You can’t measure them with the same indicators 
(Nagarajan, 2013) 
 
The Indian government is continued to grapple with establishing a medical regulatory regime 
that can distinguish between devices and drugs but tr ggling to set up a governance structure 
that will satisfy different stakeholders. The head of Indian industry association comment, 
 
FICCI was first association to take the proposal to the government that devices and 
drugs need a different formulation. We have been goi g back and forth. The 
government says the new bill is going to take time. But new bill doesn't include what 
we are suggesting; that it should include a separate chapter for devices. After all, we 
worked very hard with the health ministry to come up with the rules. But that is stuck 
in parliament, which is beyond our control. 
        (Interview data/2015) 
 
Further, new medical technologies and global markets require continuous reform of the 
respective regulatory framework and increasingly tailor-made and product-specific regulation. 
This clearly indicates that the Indian regulator needs to set up a different autonomous 
department that can work with companies, clinicians d hospitals. A senior official of a 
leading industry association suggests, 
 
We are working with the department of pharmaceuticals to create a separate division 
for medical devices and have a separate regulator. That way you can start building 
expertise. Existing situation of a regulator for devic s working under the DCGI is not 
the best way forward. You need to have a third party, standalone regulator like you 
have for telecom, insurance and finance sector. It's important that regulator should be 
independent and should be equivalent to secretary of India, reporting directly to 
minister rather than a joint secretary. 
        (Interview data/2015) 
 
In 2017 the Indian health ministry separated regulatory frameworks for manufacturing of 
drugs and devices by issuing Medical Device Rules, 2017.  Medical devices have been 
divided into four categories based on their risk type – Class A, B, C and D, where A and B 
covers low-risk devices such as diagnostic equipment and C and D cover high-risk devices 
such as implantable devices. It was notified that te central agencies will be involved in 
approving devices in C and D category. These rules were influenced by the international 
standards and strictly conform with Global Harmonisation Task Force (GHTF) framework 
further highlighting the influence of global harmonisation agreements. Building on this, the 
new Indian medical device regulations came into force on 1st January 2018.  
  
In this phase, some improvements were made: industry a sociations were more assertive and 















data suggest that weaknesses in regulation and technology policy for medical devices remain. 
This data on the evolution of medical device regulation highlight the conditions and processes 
that led to the emergence of ineffective medical device regulations in India. The different 
phases of regulatory evolution together had a significa t impact on the development of local 
production capabilities as well as ensuring access to affordable devices to the local 
population.  
 
6.0 Analysis and discussion 
The evidence presented here reveals that long-standing communication gaps between the 
Indian medical device industry and the Indian government, between different government 
departments and knowledge gaps among policymakers in understanding needs of the medical 
device sector have contributed negatively to the development of effective medical device 
regulation in India. In turn, this regulatory environment has allowed foreign-owned MNCs 
and their expensive products to dominate the Indian m rket which has had a significant 
negative impact on the development of local technological capabilities and availability of 
affordable medical devices in India 
 
Collective action: Weak government- industry- civils society organisation linkages 
Unlike countries such as the US, Japan and the EU, India consistently neglected to decouple 
regulation for medical devices from pharmaceuticals.  Following independence, successive 
Indian governments effectively supported the growth of the Indian pharmaceutical industry 
through the Patent Act of 1970 along with protections against imports and sustained 
investments in India’s pharma based S&T infrastructure, particularly the building of research 
institutes and the training of an S&T workforce. This support for pharma, and to an extent 
biotech, never transferred to the burgeoning Indian medical device industry. An overarching 
reason for this was a significant and long-standing lack of substantive linkages between the 
Indian government and the Indian medical device industry. In developing countries, the 
importance of knowledge flows between government and industry through the auspices of 
industry associations, particularly in the transfer of global knowledge on standards and 
practices to the national and local level is well established (Papaioannou et al., 2016). In 
India, the long-standing absence of a strong industry-specific association representing the 
interests of the Indian medical device industry proved to be a major barrier, preventing 
institutionalised communication and exchange of ideas between government and industry. An 
official with an industry association suggests that competing interests of domestic industry 
with MNC proved to be a major hindrance, 
 
When you say 70% of the business is done by MNCs who do not have domestic 
manufacturing, but import, there is a very strong need to sustain those imports. 
Thereby, to have an industry body which will talk in one voice to encourage domestic 
industry is not a reality today. It will not happen. I  the med-tech industry as opposed 
to the car industry, it becomes a little difficult to convince why you should stop free 
imports [when a viable domestic industry does not exist].  
         (Interview data, 2015)  
 
This gap in communication was filled by civil society and the active intervention of the 
judiciary. This ceding of political space forced governments towards framing of the regulation 
without requisite industry expertise and understanding, leading to the adoption of the 
inappropriate regulation.  While more recent efforts a  forging more appropriate regulation 















government expertise in medical devices has proven challenging, although government 
reception to the industry has improved. A head of a leading Indian orthopaedic company 
suggests, 
 
In the beginning, it was a chain of knee-jerk reactions. Now of course government 
authorities understand what is needed but it's beenfiv  years since the wrong 
regulation. We have been involved in making them understand the so the central office 
understands what is needed but now we are waiting for the amendment of the drugs 
act in which they will define medical devices independently and appropriately. 
           (Interview data, 2015) 
 
As an example of more recent efforts, the U.S. medical device trade association AdvaMed is 
working alongside the American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM), the Confederation of 
Indian Industry (CII), and FICCI in providing the Indian government a considerable amount 
of information and suggestions on ways to improve eff ctiveness of proposed medical device 
regulations. For example, these associations are woking in conjunction to lobby the Indian 
government to harmonize India’s medical device regulations to be consistent with established 
regulatory systems of the advanced countries.  
  
Policy fragmentation within government 
In addition to the Indian government's long-standing focus on pharmaceuticals to the 
exclusion of medical devices as a distinct healthcare industry, a lack of communication and 
policy coherence among different departments within e government and their areas of 
jurisdiction have compounded significant complications in developing an appropriate 
regulation. A head of leading industry association p ints out, 
 
So today we are saying simplify the regulation, why do we need to report to five 
ministries and none of these ministries talks to each other, they are all asynchronous in 
these ministries… the whole thing is they are just not working in unison and nobody 
knows all the aspects when they are making decisions on a certain subject.  
         (Interview data, 2015) 
 
Post-2005, the legislation for governing medical devic s has undergone a number of different 
drafting stages during which time the MoHFW and DST repeatedly clashed on the 
governance mechanism and debated a number of issues with limited results (interview data). 
Up to certain level, this policy fragmentation is exp cted, but these divisions and knowledge 
gaps between departments have resulted in a situation where the governance process and 
subsequent regulation of medical devices are still highly ambiguous and uncertain. Evidence 
points to continued knowledge gap among different policymakers on the precise regulatory 
needs of medical device industry.  Expressing frustrations at the pace of changes, an 
entrepreneur of an emerging diagnostic firm suggests, 
 
We are trying to create awareness but it's not coming easily. It takes time to move 
things which have been settled for so many years. We were so small that we became 
invisible for the government. 
       (Interview data) 
This evolving regulatory framework has and continues to have the significant impact on the 
development of the Indian medical device industry. I  has severely handicapped local 
manufacturers by hindering predictable access to market nd limiting the growth of a 















reinforced an Indian medical device market dominated by MNCs and their expensive products 
and the subsequent proliferation of counterfeit devices.  
 
Handicapping both local manufacturers and innovation ecosystems 
The evolving regulatory process created a significant hurdle for the local manufacturer to 
develop products locally and enter the domestic as well as international markets. A regulatory 
approval process for high-tech products was highly ad-hoc and in many cases, the local 
innovators had no idea whose approval they should take to launch a product. A head of 
orthopaedic company suggests, 
 
Doing the right things is not incentivised and that’s why the image of the country 
worsens. Reality is, if well-regulated industry exists, then all those who are doing 
counterfeit work today, will not be doing it. They would be doing right things and then 
there will be competition amongst right companies. Between them, these companies 
can do whatever is appropriate, those who can manage to create innovations or 
manage to have cost efficiency to succeed. But then t is country will get a fantastic 
image that you get good quality products in this country. It doesn't matter which 
company you go to. That is where regulation and good regulation plays a key role, in 
changing the face of the industry. 
(Interview data) 
 
The struggle for domestic companies is well evident in the example of Sri Chitra Research 
Institute. Murthy (2004) points out that from 1994 to 2004 more than 11,000 valve procedures 
were done per year in India, but only 1,000 valves d veloped by the Sri Chitra Research 
Institute were used even though they cost less than 50% of the average of imported valves. 
The Indian clinical community is averse to using devic s of the local manufacturers because 
of uncertain standards and lack of quality assurance. A leading manufacturer comments on 
attitude of Indian clinicians, 
 
It is certainly a barrier but it is not necessarily ill-founded. It's a combination of 
events. If we have to say that users should not have this mindset and we must also 
have to develop the impeccable domestic industry. So domestic industry might be 
comprised of few companies but whatever comes out of those companies is top-class. 
The day you do this then the mindset will change. But if you have a situation where 
there are a huge number of companies producing inappropriate products and a few 
companies that are doing good things. I have dealt with best companies in the world. 
They are not without problems; they have problems from quality to service delivery. I 
have seen that happened. But to the larger extent, they do it in right way, because it 
has a certain cultural thing, their strict regulatory control and then the image of that 
country is different. 
       (Interview data) 
 
Furthermore, innovation processes in the medical device sector require an interactive 
ecosystem of institutions and firms working closely with practitioners and users.  Majority of 
Indian medical device firms were engaged in the low technology products and lacked any 
motivation for collaboration, as there were no incentives for innovation or protection to 
prevent counterfeit manufacturers from encroaching the marketplace. Some success stories 
emerged out of effort from entrepreneurs but these collaborations never became 
















Over and above that regulation plays an important role so that the innovation is 
managed and well controlled. That is how it works. Without industry and clinician 
collaboration you can’t validate what you are doing. However, I am not saying it is not 
there. I am only saying it is very limited. For instance, we are working on a special 
limb salvage solution. For this type of solution, we have worked with Tata Memorial 
to develop this. This type of things needs to be done. All I am saying that there are 
examples but they are few and far in between as far as India is concerned.  
        (Interview data) 
 
In this way, the clear lack of protection and motiva on for innovation has so far prevented the 
creation of an innovation ecosystem that links medical device firms, research institutes and 
leading hospitals. Such an ecosystem might not only help facilitate the technological 
capacities of Indian firms but for doing so, might also link Indian firms to foreign-based 
MNCs and other sources of global knowledge and capabilities. 
 
Monopoly rent: MNC dominate domestic market 
 Without proper regulation, the local Indian medical device manufacturers have struggled to 
gain acceptance for their products in the domestic market and often fared poorly against 
products from foreign-owned MNCs, which were approved by the western regulators and 
backed by huge amounts of clinical trials data. This absence of local competition and total 
dependence on imports gave MNCs monopoly power over the Indian domestic market. MNCs 
sold their products in the Indian market without really taking into consideration of production 
cost or purchasing power of local populations, as there were no local competitors creating 
pressure to reduce prices and no regulation to monitor their profit margins. Thus, the total lack 
of regulation created a skewed market in favour of MNCs, allowing these companies to 
charge ‘monopoly rent’. A leading cardiac surgeon cmments on domination of MNCs firm 
on the Indian medical device industry, 
 
We are compelled to import 90% of high-end instruments, devices, etc for our 
hospitals at high cost and replace them every 3-5 years at still higher cost. This pushes 
up the cost of specialised care in cardiology, neurology, etc and makes them 
inaccessible to the majority of Indians. They play no role in the development of local 
industry and their aggressive marketing of products has inhibited indigenous R&D and 
industry. 
       (Interview data) 
 
This skewed market created immense problems for securing access of affordable devices for 
the local population. Further, MNCs were primarily involved in the distribution of medical 
devices and seek to enter the domestic market either by mploying local agents as distributors 
or setting up sales and distribution presence. A cardiac device manufacturer comments, 
 
The fact that there is no MNC investment in manufact ring here except for a few, 
which is recent and very small, says something. Out of what MNCs do in India as a 
way to sell, it's a small component they look for local development and 
manufacturing. The reason why you don't see widespread investment is itself enough 
explanation to make people understand that unless India takes a global view, it's not a 
suitable location for manufacturing and development from the perspective of being a 
conducive environment. Which is where we come back to regulation. 
















In sum, the long-standing lack of appropriate medical device regulation in India has led to a 
massive gap in technological and industrial development in a crucial sector for health. It not 
only discouraged investment in the medical device industry by the Indian government and 
Indian firms, but has also de-incentivised foreign-owned MNCs from investing in the 
manufacturing of medical devices in India – a potentially important pathway toward building 
domestic innovation ecosystems for medical devices in India. 
 
7.0 Conclusion  
This study is the first to provide an in-depth analysis of the conditions and processes involved 
in the evolution of medical device regulations in a developing country, their impact on the 
local market, firms and popular access to devices. It does this by studying the evolution of 
medical device regulation in India. It shows that the lack of regulation has had a significant 
negative impact on the development of local technological capabilities and the availability of 
affordable medical devices in India. 
 
The evidence presented here reveals the existence of communication gaps between industry 
and government, gaps between different government departments and also gaps in 
understanding the needs of the medical device sector am ng policymakers as a key challenge 
to the development of effective regulation in India. Further, different government departments 
work with their own policy objectives which adds further fragmentation and complexity to the 
process. In case of the Indian medical device regulations disagreements were concerned not 
only with the content of policies and who should in charge but also with how policies should 
be made, who should be involved and how much regulation there should be. In short, 
stakeholders should ‘mind the gap’ and make concerted efforts to bridge these ‘gaps’ to avoid 
a regulation quagmire and arrested development. 
 
Evidence from this research also shows that this gap can be bridged by stakeholders such as 
national and international industry associations, consultants and experts (Altenstetter, 2012). 
As such, substantive knowledge exchange between industry and government helps 
policymakers to understand the regulatory needs of the evolving technology and set up 
appropriate policies. This suggests that the state, ev n though the most important planning 
institution, rarely holds all the necessary expertis , bringing into sharp focus the role and 
contribution of other institutional actors such as, gain industry associations, along with civil 
society organisations and the judiciary. These different actors compete, contest and, at times, 
collaborate with each other to achieve policy outcomes that suit their objectives. This is 
critical aspect of the policy development that policy makers need to grasp as dynamics of 
science and technology unfold in India. It is critial that the contestations are embraced as 
integral process of policy development. Different coalitions emerged as policy moved from 
one stage to another with conflict and contestation forming key mechanisms for institutional 
change. This research reinforces that regulation policy is inherently political and often a 
complicated process with conflict and negotiation frming essence of the process. The 
embeddedness of this policy process in Indian politica  and social life is revealing and 
important for any discussion about what appropriate policy responses might be to the 
regulatory dilemmas presented by healthcare sector wi hin the developing country context. 
 
Similar to Scoones (2003:3) reflections on regulation in the agri-biotechnology sector, this 
research "raises a number of different perspectives, both challenging, and importantly, 
broadening, the framing of the debate from one of a narrow, "back-end" concern with risks 
and technology impacts to a much wider "front end" discussion about inclusive development”.  















with the involved actors needing to have a good understanding of technology – regulation 
interactions and their implications for affordable h althcare. As the Indian evidence suggests 
that, while regulation can create more equitable playing fields, which can be vital for 
harnessing innovation, not just any regulation willdo. We show the importance of smart 
regulation for technology and industry policy towards more inclusive healthcare. Despite the 
international pressure of uniformity and harmonisation in regulatory policy, this paper shows 
the fallacy of that approach by highlighting the significance of local contexts and how there 
clearly can be no one-size-fits-all solution. This indicates that the developing countries should 
focus on creating regulations that will ensure safety, fficacy and quality parameters that 
match consumer expectations and are suitable to the l cal context.  
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Mind the gap: Investigating the conditions and processes involved in influencing the development of 




This article represents our first publication of completely new data from fieldwork, which has been carried out 
over the last three years. There are three novel and unique contributions that we would like to make to the field 
through this paper.  
 
First, this study is the first to provide an in-depth analysis of the conditions and processes involved in the 
evolution of medical device regulation in a developing country and its impact on the local market, firms and 
access. Medical device regulations in developing countries have remained a neglected area in the Development 
Studies (DS), Science and Technology Studies (STS) and Innovation System (IS) literature. This research fills 
that gap.   
 
Secondly, and following from this first point, this paper unpacks the conditions and process associated with the 
development of medical device regulations in India and argues that gaps in policy makers’ understanding of the 
underlying technology in medical device sector, together with communication gaps between government-industry 
and among different government departments led to ineffective regulation. In turn, lack of appropriate regulation 
severely hampered the development of technological capabilities by local manufacturers, skewed markets in 
favour of MNCs and ultimately, had a damaging impact on inclusive healthcare in India.  
 
Third, it also shows that contestation and conflict act as key mechanisms through which different stakeholders 
influence, enable and/or disable institutional change. 
 
These findings have a significant impact for other developing countries which are struggling with development of 
medical device regulation appropriate to local conditions. 
